One of the reasons for this situation was certainly the “separation” of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte from the United States. For most of his tenure, Duterte sought to politically distance Manila from his alliance with Washington. But another, less appreciated, reason for this situation was the dismal state of the Philippine Army`s External Defense Forces. This was not only the underlying cause of the Philippines` failure to counter Chinese actions in the South China Sea, but also the ambiguity that had deprived the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty of its deterrent power. Fortunately for Manila, things have started to change. The Philippines has slowly begun to rebuild its external defense forces and gain greater international recognition for its claims. This, coupled with a shift in America`s strategic sentiment toward China, could breathe new life into the treaty. Despite Duterte`s initial foreign policy changes, experts warn that he cannot sever relations with Washington without risking a negative reaction from the Philippine political and military establishment and the Filipino public. Leadership changes in the United States and the Philippines may pose diplomatic challenges, but defense relations are expected to remain strong. Nevertheless, Bower said, U.S. and Philippine leaders must provide their people with a strong case for maintaining this historic relationship and building a regional security network across a range of capabilities, budgets, personnel and expertise. The U.S.-Philippines defense treaties were among the first major U.S. security treaties in the Asia-Pacific region and served as a cornerstone of U.S.

policy to maintain regional peace and security after World War II. Throughout the Cold War, Philippine outposts were important deployment areas for land, sea, and air forces during the Vietnam War. ==External links==In the 1980s, between thirteen and fifteen thousand military personnel and twelve thousand civilians of the Department of Defense were stationed in the Philippines. Revival of Philippine military power. The first changes in the strategic environment occurred in 2010. It was then that former Philippine President Benigno Aquino III began the long process of reviving his country`s external defense forces. He led important laws in the Philippine Congress that streamlined and reformed military procurement. His administration then drafted a 15-year modernization program for the Philippine military. Most importantly, he got the legislative funding for that. Although parts of the program have been delayed since then, his successor, Duterte, has continued to do so. In 2015, the Philippine Air Force received its first jet fighter jet in more than 40 years, and in 2020, its navy ordered its first missile-capable warships. Better yet for Manila`s claims to the South China Sea, the Philippine Marine Corps will receive its first battery of Indian-made BrahMos anti-ship cruise missiles, whose range covers most of the Philippines` 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone.

The way in which the Philippines` external defense forces reached such a low point can be attributed to a combination of factors: the end of the Cold War, the need for Manila to combat internal insurgency, and its military`s consistently low budget priority. However, unlike other U.S. allies in the Defense Treaty, such as Germany, the Philippines has not attempted to keep U.S. forces close (i.e., on its soil) to compensate for its declining military capability. Instead, Manila threw the United States out of its bases in 1991 into a fit of nationalist sophistication. Thus, the Philippines – without its own external defense forces or those of the United States – has left itself completely dependent on the terms of its mutual defense treaty with the United States to deter possible foreign aggression. International recognition of Philippine claims. The Philippines has also strengthened its transfer through its mutual defense treaty with the United States through other means. In 2016, the Aquino government won a three-year lawsuit before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) against China`s “nine-stroke line” in the South China Sea. While much of the attention received by the PCA`s decision has focused on invalidating the Chinese claim, there has also been a boost to Philippine maritime claims. The court upheld the Philippines` sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone and concluded that Philippine fishing activities around the Scarborough Shoal were legal.

This international recognition gave Manila additional influence in its contractual relations with Washington. The more the Philippines can gain international recognition of its claims, the harder it will be for the United States not to include them in the treaty. In accordance with article I of the Treaty, each Party shall settle international disputes peacefully so that world peace is not threatened and shall refrain from the threat of the use of force in a manner incompatible with the purpose of the United Nations. [2] Article II provides that each Party, individually or jointly through mutual assistance, may acquire, expand and maintain its capacity to resist armed attacks […].