Since natural law presupposes universalizing rules, it does not take into account the fact that different people or cultures may see the world differently. For example, if people interpret differently what it means for something to be right or just, the results will be different. The thesis of separability, at the most general level, simply denies the thesis of overlapping naturalism; according to the separability thesis, there is no conceptual overlap between the terms law and morality. As Hart interprets it more narrowly, the separability thesis is “just the simple assertion that it is in no way a necessary truth that laws reproduce or meet certain requirements of morality, when in fact they have often done so” (Hart 1994, 185-186). At least three answers are available to natural law theorists. The first answer is Hobbesian and stems from a subjectivist theory of goodness. As for subjectivist theories of goodness, it is true that something is good, that it is desired or loved, or that it is somehow the object of its own pro attitudes, or under appropriate conditions would be the object of its own pro attitudes. One might think that the assertion of a subjectivist theory of goodness in the face of the immense variation of human desire signifies the rejection of the theory of natural law. But this is not the case. For it could be argued that man`s common nature, his similarity in physiological constitution, leads him to have common desires, and these desires can be so central to human goals and purposes that we can build important and correct commandments of rationality around them.

This is what Hobbes claims. Because if, according to Hobbes, what is good is what is desired, Hobbes believes that humans are built in a similar way so that for every human being (if it functions biologically correctly), its central goal is to avoid violent death. Thus, Hobbes is able to construct his entire theory of natural law around a single good, the good of self-preservation, which is so important to human life that binding commandments can be formulated without exception regarding its execution. Man is not taught the natural law per se, but we “discover” it by constantly making decisions for good rather than evil. Some schools of thought believe that the natural law is transmitted to man through a divine presence. To [2]: A theory of natural law that is aware of the normal expediency of the rule of law and not of judges (see 1.3) may well be more cautious than Dworkin himself when it comes to departing from established law (based on social facts). In cases where such a deviation is morally justified, the theory will indicate that the judge is authorized to proceed according to the superior and eternal law of humanity, the ius gentium, or a set of universal principles of law and justice common to all civilized peoples, which is the permanent law – more precisely, that, which has been accepted in the judiciary as a firm right – deprived of its directivity for subjects and judges. Is this moral authorization also “legal” and “in accordance with the law”? Does this mean that the permanent law, which the judge is morally entitled to overturn, is treated as not being a law even before the judge pronounces the verdict? The following section argues that this question must be answered with yes and no. Although natural law applies primarily to the field of ethics and philosophy, it is also widely used in theoretical economics.

But there is another type of theory of natural law that has to do with the relationship between morality and law. According to the theory of natural law, there is no clear distinction between the concept of law and the concept of morality. Although there are different versions of the theory of natural law, all subscribe to the thesis that there are at least some laws that depend for their “authority” not on an already existing human convention, but on the logical relationship in which they are to moral norms. Otherwise, some norms are authoritative because of their moral content, even if there is no convention that makes moral merit a criterion of legal validity. The idea that the concepts of law and morality overlap in one way or another is called the overlap thesis. Thomas Aquinas merged human rights (lex humana) and positive law (lex posita or ius positivum). [3] [4] [5] However, there is a subtle distinction between them. . . .